An Address of members of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, to their constituents, on the subject of the war with Great Britain [microform]

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bers of the House of Representatives,

? CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATE,

TO THEIR

_ CONSTITUENTS,

THE SUBJECT OF THE WAR WITH GREAT
i BRITAIN.

PHILADELPHIA:

PRINTRO: AT. THE OFPice OF TuR UNITED STATES’ OAZETTE.

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any. stag
of debate
cédented|
reasons {

ot easi!
ever, on

mn A Republick has’ for its basis the

a _ capacity and right of the people to govern

“oe o} themselves. principle ofa repre-
ye sentative republick is the responsibili

of the representatives to their consti-
/|- tuents. Freedom and publicity of debate
‘ .& ave essential to the preservation of such
§ forms of government. Every arbitrai.-
B abridgment of the right of speech in re-
| presenfatives, is a direct infringement of
the liberty of the people. Every unne-.
im cesuary concealment of their proceedings
‘an approximation towardstyranny. When
.by systematick rules, a majority takes to
t the right, at its pleasure, of limit-
ing .speech, or denying it, altogether;
hem secret sessions multiply; and in
sas eget to the importance of questions,
Tsthe studious concealment of debate, a

') @hpeople may be assured, that such prac-
“(tices continuing, their freedom is but
a . Reflections, such as these, have been

forced upon the. attention of the under-
§ signed; members of the house of repre-
sentatives of the United States, by the
eyents of the present session of congress.
They. have witnessed a principle, adopt-
‘t ed’ as. the law of the house, by which,
under, a novel application of the previous
question, a power is assumed by the ma-
jority to deny the privilege of speech, at
* _ | any. stage, and under any circumstances
~ ©, \of debate.: And recently, by an unpre-

‘| cédented assumption, the right to give

“e.* treasons for an original motion, has been
‘ ) — §made to depend upon the'will of the ma-

coe gpority.
ote Principles more hostile than these to the
«. fexistence of represcntative liberty, can-
ae ot easily be conceived. It is not, how-

ever, on these accounts, weighty as they

. ADDRESS.
The undersigned Members of the House of Representatives,
ere to their respective Constituents.

are,that the undersigned have undertaken
this address. A subject of higher and
more immediate importance impels them
to the present duty. . 4

The momentous question of war, with
Great Britain, is decided. On this topick,
so vital to your interests, the right of
publick debate, in the face of the world,
sud especially of their constituents, has
been deniedto your representatives. They
have been called into secret session, on
this most interesting of all your publick
relations, although the circumstances of
the time and of the nation, afforded no
one reason for secrecy, unless it be found
in the apprehension of the effect of pubs
lick debate, on publick opinion; or of pub-
lick opinion on the result of the vote.

Except the message of the president
of the United States, which is now be-
fore the publick, nothing confidential was
communicated. That message contained
no fact, not previously known. No one
reason for war was intimated, but such
as was of a nature publick and notorious.
The intention to wage war and invade
Canada, had been long since openly avow-
ed. The object of hostile menace had
been ostentatiously announced. The in-
adequacy of both our army and navy, for
successful invasion, and the insufficiency
of the fortifications for the security of
our seaboard were every ‘where known.
Yet the doors of congress were shut upon
the people. They have been carefully
kept in ignorance of the progress of mea-
sures, until the purposes of administra-
tion were consummated, and the fate of
the country sealed. Ina situation so ex-
traordinary,the undersigned have deemed
it their duty by no act of theirs to sanction
w proceeding, so novel and arbitrary. On

AY

Wie contrary, they made every attempt, the system, liad beco’ne identified with

{in their power, to attain publicity fortheir the pride, the character, and the hope.of »

proceedings., All such attempts were our cabinet. As is natural with men,
vain, When this momentous subject ‘who have a great stake depending on the
was stated, as for debate; they demande © success of a favourite theory, pertinacity
ed that the dcors should be opened. seemed te increase as its hopelessness

_, Phis being:refused, they declined dis- hecame apparent. As the inefhiciency, of"

cussion; being perfectly convinced, from this system could not.be admitted, by ite
indications, too plain'tobe misunderstood advocates, without ensuring its abandon-

that, in the house, all argument, with ment, ill success was, carefully attributed |

closed doors, was hopeless; and that any to.the influence of <i he s
act, giving implied validity to so flagrant To this cause the people were taught’
an abuse of power, would be little less . to charge its successive failures and not

than treachery to the essential rights of to. its intrinsiek imbecility. In this state’
afree people. In the situation, to which ofthings the undersigned deemed it on
hes.

the undersigned have thus been reduced, per, to take away all apology for
they are compelled, reluctantly to resort rence to this oppressive system. They
to this publick declaration of such views were desirous, at a period'so critical it

of the state and relations of the country, publick- affairs, as far as was consistent»
as determined their judgmentand vote with the. independence of opinion,'to |

upon the question of war. “A measure contribute to the restoration of harmony

of this kind has appeared to the under- in the publick councils, and concord '

signed to be more imperiously demand- gmong the people. And if any advan-

ed by the circumstance of a mes- tage could he thus obtained inour foreign
sage and manifesto being prepared and relations, the undersigned, being: ene °
Circulated at publick expense, in which gaged in-no purpose of personal or party -
the causes for war were enumerated, and advancement, would rejoice, in such an!

‘ ye

the motives for it concentrated,inia man- occurrence. ist
ner suited to agitate and influence the | The course of publick measures also

publick mind. In cxecuting this task it at the opening of the session, gave Lope:

will be the study of the undersigned to that an enlarged & enlighter -4 system 0
reconcile the great duty they owe tothe defence, with provision for, or security of
people, with that constitutional respect our maritime rights, was about'to be come
which is due to the administrators ofpub- menced; a purpose, which, wherever
lick concerns. found, they deemed it their duty to foster,
In commencing this view of our af- by giving, to any system of meabures,
fairs, the undersigned would fail in duty thus comprehensive, as unobstructed a
to themselves did they refrain from re- course as was consistent with their gene-
curring to the course, in relation to pub- ral sense of publick duty. After a course
lick measures, which they adopted, and of policy, thus liberal and conciliatory,
have undeviatingly pursued, from the it was cause of regret that a communicas
commencement of this long and eventful tion should have been purchased by an.
session; in which they deliberately sacri- unprecedented expenditure of secret ser-
ficed every minor consideration to what vice money; and used,.by the chief ma-
they deemed the best interests of the gistrate, to disseminate suspicion and
country. jealously; and td excite resentment,
For a suecession of years the under- among the citizens, by suggesting impu-
signed have, from principle, disapproved tations against a portion of them, as
a Series of restrictions upon commerce, unmerited by-their patriotism, as unwar-
according to their estimation, inefficient ranted by evidence.
as respected foreign nations and injuri- It hag always been the opinion of the
ous, Chiefly, to ourselves. Success, in undersigned, that a system of peace was

to trial,
by whi
‘that of
activity
and dani
ment.

} count
thadiinc
the un
mistake

“war, we
only fro
our mea
political
very ge

It ap;
wrong's,

jency, of”
dl, by. ite
bandon-
tributed
€ taught
s and not
this state |
od it pro-'
for adhe

ny advane »

ur foreign 5
peing: ene

wherever
ty to foster,
measures,
pstructed. a
their gene-
er a course
onciliatorys
ommunica-
ased by an.
secret sere
b chief mae
picion and
esentment,
sting impu-
them, as
» as unwar-

nion of the

| ment.

f peace was

the policy, which most adepones with
the character, condition, and interest of
the United States; that their remoteness
from the theatre of-contest, in Lurope,
was their peculiar felicity and shat-noth-
ing but.a necessity, absolutely imperious,
should induce them to enter as parties
into wars, in. which every consideration
of virtue and policy seems to be forgot-
ten, under thé overbearing sway of rapa-
city and ambition, “There is:a new cra
inhuman affaivs. «The European world
is convulsen..i The advantages. of our
own situationare peculiar. «© Why * quit
our-own to stand upon foreign ground ?
Why, by. interweaving our destiny with
that of any part of Europe, entangle our
peace and prosperity in the toils of Euro-
pean ambition, rivalship, interest, hu-
mout, or caprice ?”

~ Iwaddition to the many moral and pru-
dential: considerations, which should de-

_ ter thoughtful men from hastening into

the perils of such a war, there were some
eculiar to the United States, resulting
m the texture of the government and
the: political relations of the people. A
form of government, in no small degree
experimental, composed of powerful and
independent sovereignties associated in

® velations, some of which are critical, az

well-as novel, should not be hastily pre-
cipitated into situations, calculated to put
totrial, the strength of the moral bond,
by. which they are united. Of all states,
that of war is most likely to call into
activity the passions, which are hostile
and dangerous.to such a form of govern-
Time is yet important to our
country to settle and mature its recent
institutions. Above all, it appeared to
the undersigned from signs not to be
mistaken, that if we entered upon this
‘war, we did it as a divided people; not
only from a sense of the inadequacy of
our means to success, but from moral and
political objections of great weight and
very general influence.

It appears tothe undersigned, that the
wrongs, of which the U. States have to

* Washington,

(i

5

complain, although in some aspects, very
grievous to our interests, and in. many
humiliating to our. pride, were yet of a
nature which in the present state of the
world, either would not justify war, or
which...war would not remedy. Thus,
far instance. the hovering of British ves-
sels upon our coasts, and the occasional
insults to-our ports, imperiously deman-
ded such a systematick application of hare
bour.and seacoast defence, as would ree
pel, such: aggressions; but in no light,
can they be considered as’ making a ree
sort to war, at the present time, on the
part of the United States, either necessary
or expedient. . So also, with respect to
the Indian war, of the origin of which,
but very imperfect imformation has as
yet been given tothe publick, Without
any express act of Congress, an expedi
tion. was last. year, set on foot and
prosecuted into Indian Yerritory, which
had been relinquished by treaty, on the
part of the United States. And now
we are told about the agency of British
traders, as to Indian. hostilities. It de-
serves consideration, whether there has
been such provident attention, as would
have been proper to remove any cause
of. complaint, either real or imaginary,
which the Indians might allege, and to
secure their friendship. With all the
sympathy and anxiety excited by the
state of that frontier; important as. it
may be, to apply adequate means of pro-
tection, against the Indians, how is its
salety ensured by a deciaration of war,
which adds the British to the: number of
enemies?

As “ a decent respect to the opinions
of mankind” has not induced the two
houses of congress to concur in declar-
ing the reasons, or motives, for their
qnacting a declaration of warythe under-
signed and he publick are left.to search,
clsewhere, for causes either real, or os-
tensible. If we are to consider the pre-
sident ofthe United States, and the com-
mittee of the house of representatives,
on foreign relations, as speaking on this
solemn occasion, for congress, the Uni-
ted States have three principal tonicks ¢f

eT ee ae orders in

council. '
Concerning the subject of impress-

ments, the undersigned sympathize with

our unfortunate seamen, the victims of

this abuse of power, and participate in
the national sensibility, on their endo
They do not conceal from themselves,
both its.importance and its difficulty; and
they are well aware how stubborn ‘is
the will end how blind the visidn of pow-

erful nations, when great interests grow .

into controversy.

But, before a resort to war for such,
interests, a moral nation will considcr
what is just,and a wise nation what is
expedient. If the exercise of any right
to the full extent of its abstract nature,
be inconsistent with the safety of another
nation, morality seems to require that,
in practice, its exercise should, in this
respect, be modified. Ifit te proposed
to vindicate any right by war, wisdom
demanis that it should be of a nature,
by war to be obtained. The interests
connected with the subjects of impress-
ments are unquestionably great to both
nations; and in the full extent of abstract
right as asserted by each, perhaps irre-
concilable.

The government of the United States
asserts the ‘broad principle, that the flag
of their merchant vessels shall protect
the mariners. This’ privilege is claim-
ed, although every person on board, ex-
cept the captain, may be an alien.

‘The British government asserts that
the allegiance of their subjects is ina-
lienable, in time of war, and that their
seamen, found on the sca, the common
highway of nations, shall not be protect-
ed by the flag of private merchant vessels.

“The undersigned deem it unnecessary
here to discuss the question of the .A-
merican claim, for the immunity of their
flag. But they cannotreftain from view-
ing it asa principle, of a nature very
broad and comprehensive, to the abuse
of which the temptations are strong and
numerous. And they do maintain that,
before the calamities of war, ‘in vindica-

6

a gulate
of the right;‘so that the acknows
ledged injury, to other nations,
pre

hey are clearly’ of
peace of this happy and
ty should not be abandoned, for the sake

of affording facilities to cover #Frenc
property;'or to employ British s t
he claim ‘of Great Britain to the sere
vices of her seamen is neither novel nor
peculiar. The doctrine of alle ;

for which she contends is common to

the governments of Europe. France:
as well as England, has maintained it
for centuries. Both nations claim) in |
time of war, the services of their’ subs
jects. Both by decrees forbid their en-.
tering into foreign employ. Both recall
them by proclamation. 1

No mun can doubt that, in the’ pres.

sent state of the French marine, if Ames
rican merchant vessels were met at sea)
having French seamen on board, France
would take them. Will any man believé
that the United States would go'to ‘war
against France, on this account ?

For very obvious reasons, this prificis
ple occasions little collision with France;
or with any other nation, except Eng-
land. With the English nation, the
people of the United States are closely.
assimilated, in blood, language, inter-
course, habits, dress, manners, and cha+
racter. When Britain is at war and the
United S.ates neutral, the merchant sers '
vice of the United States holds out to
British seamen, temptations almost irre.
sistible ;—high wages and peaceful ems
ploy; instead of low wages and war sers’
vice ;—safety, in licu of hazard ;—entire
independence in the place of qualified
servitude. ;

That England whose situation is insus
lar, who is engaged in a war apparently
for existence, whose seamen are her bul.
wark, should look upon the effect ofour
principle upon her safety with jealousy
is inevitable; and that she will not haz-

7

ard the. practical consequences of its men, in the merchants’ service of the U.

all
dibe ex: exercise is certain. The States, is as little reconcilable with the
: 06 ‘th ’ prqnaninds directly, ermanent as the present intcrest of the
@ the for the de of the thoughtful and United States. The encouragement of
J acknows virtuous in this country, is—whe- foreign seamen isthe discouragement of
7 nations, ,fo> such an abstract right be the native American.
revented: tifiable, before atterapting to guard The duty of government towards this
that the against its injurious oe by legis- valuable class of men.is not only to pro- -
communi. Jative regulation, in failure of treaty. tect but to pacronize them. And this
ythesake = A dublous tight should be advanced cannot be done more effectually than by
or ® wit hesitation. An extreme right should securing to American citizens the privi-
eamens (@ be.asserted with discretion., Moral duty leges of American navigation.
othe sere req. that a nation, before i, appeals The question of. impressment, like’
novel nor to iteelt, should have been not only true every other question relative to com-
ile to itself, but that it should have failed in merce, has been treated in such a man-
mon to a no, duty to others. If the exercise of a ner, that what was possessed is lost with-
France, an unregulated manner, bein out obtaining what was sought. Pre-
atained it fect, a standing invitation to the sub- tensions, right in theory, and important
claim; in @ jects of a foreign power to become de- in interest, urged, without due conside-
ieir aubs (§ serters and traitors, is it no injury to that ration of our relative power, have even-
their en- tuated in a practical abandonment, both

power?
Ce::ainly moral, obligation demands of what we hoped and what we enjoyed.

that the right of flag, like all other hu-

3s. @ man rights, should be so used, as that,

while. it. protects what is our own, it
should.not injure what is another’s. In
@ practical view, and so long as the right
nf flag is restrained, by no regard to the
ndeniable interests. of others, a war, on
account. of impressments, is only a war
pr the right of employing British sea-
men on American merchant vessels.
. The claim of Great Britain pretends
> no further extent than to take Brizish
eamen from private merchant vessels.
ip the exercise of this claim, her officers
ke. American seamen, and foreign sea-
en, in the American service; and al-
bugh she disclaims such abuses, and
offers redress, whcn known, yet un-
ubtedly grievous injuries have resulted
the seamen of the United States. But
@ question is: Can war be proper for
ch cause, beforejall hope of reasonable
pommodation has failed? Even after the
ttingui

shment of such hope, can it be
our own practice be so re-
led as to remove, in such foreign
: y reasonable apprehension of
The undersigned are clearly of opi-

ma. that the employment of British sea-

Vales)

In attempting to spread our flag over foe |
reigners, its distinctive character has
been lost to our own citizens.

The American seaman, whose interest
it is to have no competitors in his em-
ployment, is sacrificed, that British sea-
men may have equal privileges with
himself.

Ever since the WU. States have been a
nation, this subject has been a matter of
complaint and negotiation; and every
former administration have treated it, ac-
cording to its obvious nature, as a sub-
ject rather for arrangement than for war.
It existed in the time of Washington;
yet this, father of his country recom-
mended no such resort. It existed in the
time of Adams; yet notwithstanding the
zeal in support of our maritime rights
which distinguished his administration,
war was never suggested by him as.the
remedy. During the eight years Mr.
Jefferzoi: siood at the helm of affairs, it
still continued: a subject of controversy
and negotiation: but it was never made
a cause for war. It was reserved for
the present administration to press this

topick to'thé extreme and most dreadful
-resort of nations; although England has

officially disavowed the right of impress-

8 ih seein

8

ment as it respects native citizens, and
an arrangement ‘might well be made
consistent with the fair pretensions of
‘such’as are naturalized. soni gel

That the real state of this question
may be understood; the undersigned re-
cur to the following facts as supported
by official documents. Mr. King, when
minister in Eygland, obtained a disavow-
al of the British government of the right
to impress American seamen, natufalized
as well as native, on the high seas.’ An
arrangement had advanced nearly to a
conclusion upon this basis, and was bro-
ken off only because G. Britain insisted
to retain the right:on the narrow scas.
‘What, however; was the opinica of the
American minister on the probability of
‘an arrangement appears from the publick
documents comnwnicated to congress in
in the session of 1808, as stated by Mr.
Madison, in these’ words: + At the mo
ment the articles were expected to. be
‘signe, asexception of * the narrow seas’
was urged’and insisted on by lord St.
Vincents, and being utterly inadmissible
on our par', the negotiation was aban-
doned.”

Mr. Kinz seems to be of opinion,
howeve;, that “ with more time than was
left him for the experiment, the objec-
-tion might have been overcome.” What
‘time was left Mr. King for the experi-
‘ment, or whether any was ever made, has
not been disclosed to the publick. Mr.
King, soon after returned to America—
It is manifest from Mr. King’s expres-
sion that“he was limited in point of time,
and it is equally. clear that his. opinion.
was, that an adjustment could take place
That Mr. Madison was ‘also of the same
opinion is demonstrated by his letters to
Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, dated the
- 3d of February, 1807, in which he uses
these expressions: « [I take it for grant-
ed that you have not failed to make due
use of the arrangemyent concerted by:

Mr. King with lord Hawksbury ‘in the
year 1802, for settling the question’ of
impressment. On that occasion, and un-

der that administration, the British prin-
ciple was fairly renounced tn favour of

:
*
;

the right of our flag, lor’ Hawkesbury
having agreed fr SHS imfreasments
on the ‘high seas,’ and lord St. Vinge
requiring nothing more than.an

tion’ of the nertee seas, an ©
resting on the obsolete "chains 8f i,
tain to some peculiar ‘dominion’ over
them.” Here then we ‘have a full ac-

w ;

of the nation, the relinquishment of ‘the
right was a measure, which the aba
ment could not ade)it, without taking on
itself'a responsiviiiy, which no ministr;
would be willing to meet, howarir rest:
ing the exigency might be. ‘They offers
ed, however, on the part of Great Briti m
to’ pass laws making it penal for Brit
commanders to impress American’ citi-
zens, on board of American vessels, On °
the high seas, if America would’ pass’a
law, making it penal for the officers of
the United States to grant certificates of
citizenship to British pts tit This -
will be found, in the same documents, in

a letter trom Messrs. Monroe: and Pinks
ney'to Mr. Madison, dated 11th Novem.
ber, 1806. Under their peremptory in-
structions, this proposition, on the’ part
Great Britain, could not be acceded to by
our ministers. “Such, “however, was thé
temper and anxiety of England, and’sach
‘the candour and good sense ‘of our mi-

nisters, that an honourable andadvan- —

tageous arrangement did take place, The
authority of Mr, Monroe, then minister
at the court of'Great Britain, now secre-
tary of state, and one of the present ad-
ministration,*who have _ recommended

‘war with England, and assigned impréss-
ments as a Sule Mapper chestders

nese in asserting, that it was honour-
able and advantageous: for ina. letter
from Richmond dated the 28th of. Veb-
fuary, 1808, to Mr. Madison, the fc ilow-
ing exptessions are used by Mr, Mon-
roe: # I have, on the contrary always be-
lieved and still do believe that the ground
on which that interest [impressment } was
placed by the. paper of the,British com-
missioners of 8th .November, 1806, and
the explanation which accompanied it,
was both-honourable and advantageous to
the United States, thatit contained a-con-
cession in their favour on the part of
-Great Britain, on the great principle in
contestation, never before made by a
formal and obligatory act of their govern-
ment, whic) was highly favourable to
their interest.”

With thie opinion of Mr. King so de-
cidedly evpressed; with the official ad-
mission »' Mr. Madison; with the ex-
_ plicit declaration of Mr. Monroy, all con-
curring that Greot Britain was ready to
abandon impressment on the high seas,
and with “an honourable and advantage-
ous arrangement, actually made by Mr.
Monroe, how can it be pretended, that all
hope of setuciment, by treaty, has tailed?
how can this subject furnish a proper
cause of war?

With respect to the subject of block-
--ades; the principle of the law of nations,
as asserted by the U, States, is, that a
blockade can only be justified when sup-
ported by an adequate force. In theory
this principle is admitted by Great Bri-
ain. It is alleged, however, that ia
ractice she disregatds that principle.

The order of blockade, which has been
made a specifickjground ot complaint by
France, is that of the 16th of May 1806,
Yet, strange as it may seem, this order,
which is, now, made one ground of war
-between the two countries, was, at the
. time of its first issuing, viewed as an act
of favour and conciliation. On this sub-
*] ject it isnecessary to be explicit. The
vague and indeterminate manner, in

_which the American and French govern-

_ments, in their official paptrs, speak of
this order of blockade, is calculated to

x
*
ay

9

mislead. An importance is attached to
it, of which, in the opinion of the,under-
signed, it is not worthy.’ Let the facts
speak for themselves.

In Aug. 1804, the British éstablished
a blockade at the entrance of the French
ports, naming them, from Fecam™ to Os-
tend;, and from their proximity to the
British coasts, and the absence of all
complaint; we may be petmitted to be-
lieve that it was a legal blockade, ene
forced according to the usages of nations.
On the 16th of May, 1806, the English
Sccretary of state, Mr. Fox, notified to
our minister at London, that his govern-
ment had thought fit to direct necessary
measures to be taken for the blockade of
the :oasts, rivers and ports, from the
river Elbe.to the river Brest, both in-
clusive.*

In point of tact, as the terms used in
the order will show, this paper, which
has become a substantive and) avowed
cause for non intercourse, embargo and
war, is a blockade, only of the places, on
the French coast, from Ostend. to the
Seine, and even as to these it is, merely,
as it professes to be, a continuance of a
former and existing blockade. For with
respect to the residue of the coast, trade
of neutrals is admitted, with the excep.
tion only, of enemy’s property and arti.
cles contraband of war, which are liable

‘to be taken, without.a blockade;‘and ex-

cept the direct colonial trade of the cne-
my, which Great Britain denied'to be

RMA CARRERE ls Nia intl BLN

* Lhe terms of the order ave these: “ ‘That
the said coast, rivers and ports must be consi-
dered as blockaded,” but, “that such block.
ade shall not extend to prevent neutral ships
and vessels, laden with goods, not being the pro-
perty of his majesty’s enemies, and not being
contraband of war from approaching’ the said
coasts and entering into and sailing from the
said rivers and ports save and except the coast-
rivers and ports from Ostend to the river Seine,
already in a state of strict and rigorous block-
ade; andwhich are to be considered as so con.
tinued,” with a proviso that the vessels enter,
ing had not been laden at a port belonging to,
or in possession of, the enemies.of G. Britain,
and the vessels departing were not destined tv
an enemy port, or had previously broken block.
ade.”

3

i
4
Ls

10

free by the law of nafions. Why the or-
der was thus extended, in its form, while
in effoct it added nothing to orders and
regulations, already existing, will be
known by adverting to papers which are
before ‘the world. In 1806, France had
yet colonies, and the wound inflicted on
our feelings; by the interference of the
British government in our trade with
those colonies, had been the cause of re-
monstrance and negotiation, At the mo-

ment when the order of may 1806,:was-
made, Mr. Monroe, the present secreta-,

ry of state, then our minister plenipoten-
tiary at the court of Great Britain, was
in treaty on the subject of the carrying
trade, and judging on the spot, and at the
time. he unhesitatingly gave his opinion,
that the order was made to favour Ame-
riéan views and interests. This idea is
unequivocally expressed, in Mr. Mon-
roe’s ietters to Mr, Madison of the 17th,
and 20th* of May, and of the 9th of June,
1896,

And as late as October, 1811, the same

entleman, writing as secretary of state
to the British mizister, speaking of the
same order of blockade of May, 1806,
says: “It strictly was little more than a

* The following are extracts from these let-
ters. In that of the 17th May 1806, he thus
speaks of that blockade. It is ** couched in
terms of restraint, and professes to extend the
blockade further than was heretofore done.
nevertheless, it takesjit from many ports already
blockaded, indeed, from all East of Ostend, and
West of the Seine, except in articles contra-
band of war and enemies property, which are
seizable without blockade. And in like form
of exception, considering every enemy as one
power, it admits the trade of neutrals, within
the same limits, to be free in the productions
of enemies colonies, in every, but the direct
route between the colony and the parent coun.
try.’ Mr. Monroe adds: * It cannot be doubt-
af that the note was drawn by the government,
in reference to the question, and if intended as
the foundation of a treaty, must be viewed in a
very favourable light.” On the 20th of May, Mr.
Monroe writes to Mr. Madison, that he had
been ‘strengthened in the opinion that the
order of the 16th was drawn with a view tc the
question of our trade with eneinies colonies,
and that it promises to be highly satisfactory to
our commercial intevests.”

eS iat

blockade of the coast from Seine to Os-
tend,” “The object was to afford to the
U. States an accommodation respectilig
the colonial trade.”

It appears, then, that thisxorder was.in
point of fact, made to favour our trade
and was so understood and admitteed by
the government of this country, at that
time and since; that, insteatl. of extend-
ing prior blockades it lessened them:
that the country from Seine to Brest,
and from Ostend to Elbe was. ‘inserted
to open them to our colonial trade and

for our accommodation, and that it was -

never made the subject of complaint, by
the American government, during its
practical continuance; that is; not until
the first order in council; and-indeed, not
until after the first of May 1810; and
until after the American government was
apprised of the ground, which it was the

will of France should be taken upon the"

subject.

Of this we have the most decisive
proof in the offers. made under the ad-
ministration of Mr. Jefferson, for the
discontinuance of the embargo as it re-
lated to Great Britain; none of which re-
quired the repeal of the blockade of May
1806; and also in the arrangement made
during the administration of Mr. Madi-
son, and under hig eye with Mr. Erskine.
The non intercourse act. of March 1809,
and the act “ concerning commercial ine
tercourse.” of May 1810, vest the presi-
dent of the United States with the very
same power, in the very same terms.
Both authorize him “ir case either G.
Britain or France shall so revoke or mo-
dify her edicts, as that they shall cease
to violate the neutral commerce of the
United States,” to declare the same by
proclamation. And, by the provisions of
one law in such case, non intercourse was
to cease; by those of che other it was to
be revived. In consequence of power
vested, by the first act, the arrangement
with Erskine was made and the revocae
tion of the orders in council of January
and November 1807, was considered as
a full compliance with the law and as
removing all the, anti-neutral edicts.—

Seine to Os
Afford to the
h respecting

order was.in
r our trade
dmitteed by
try, at that

- of extend-
sened them:
¢ to Brest,
as. inserted
l trade and
that it was
bmplaint, by
during its
$; not until
indeed, not
1810; and
rnment was
h it was the

en upon the |

st decisive
der the ade
n, for the
rO as it ree
if which re-
ade of May
‘ment made
Mr. Madi-
ir. Erskine,
March 1809,
mercial ine
t the presi-
th the very
me terms.
e either G.
oke or moe
hall cease
rce of the
i¢ same by
‘ovisions of
course was
r it was to
| Of power
rangement
the revocae
of January
sidered as
tw and as
| edicts.

The blockadé of May 1806, was not in-
cluded in the arrangement, and it does
not appear, that it was deerjcu of suffi-
cient, importance to engage even a
thought. Yet under the act of May,
1810, which vests the very same power,
a revocation of this blockade of May
‘1806, is made by. our cabinet a sine qua
won; an indispensible requisite! And now
after the British minister has directly
avowed that this order of blockade would
not continue after a revocation of the
orders in council, without a due applica-
tion of an adequate force, the existence
of this blockade is insisted upon, as a

_ justifiable cause of war, notwithstanding,

that our government admits a blockade
is legal, to the maintenance of whieh an
adequate force is applied.

The undersigned are aware that in
justification of this new ground, it is

‘now said that the extension on paper, for

whatever purpose intended, favours the
principle of paper blockades. This how-
ever, can hardly be urged, since the
British* formally disavow the principle;
and since they acknowledge the very
doctrine of the law of nations for which
the American administration contend,
henceforth the existence of a blockade
becomes a question of fact: it must de-
pend upon the evidence adduced in sup-
ort of the adequacy of the blockading
orce,
From the preceding statement it is ap-
parent that whatever there is objection-

* Mr. Foster in his letter of the 3d July 1811,
‘to Mr. Monroe, thus states the doctrine main.
tained by his government.

“Great Britain has never attempted to dis-
pute that, in the ordinary course of the law of
nations, no blockade can be justifiable or valid,
unless ‘it be supported by an © adequate force
destined to maintain it, and to expose to ha-
zard all vessels attempting to evade its ope-
vation.”

Mr. Foster in his letter to Mr. Monroe of the
26th July, 1811, als. says: “The blockade of
May 1806, will not cominue after the repeal of
the orders in council, unless his majesty’s go-
vernment shall think iit to sustain it by the
special apolication of a sufficient naval force,
and the fact of its being so continued, or not,
will be notified at the time.”

Ml

able in the principle of the order of
May 1806, or in the practice under it,
on ground merely American, it cannot
be set up as a sufficient cause of war;
for until France pointed it. out asa cause
of controversy, it was so far from being
regarded as a source of any new or
grievous complaint, that it was actually
considered by our government in a ia-
vourable light. :

The British orders in council are the
remaining source of discontent, and
avowed cause of war. These have here-
tofore been considered by our govern-
ment in connexion with the French de-
crees. Certainly the Sritish orders in
council and French decrees form a sys-
tem subversive of neutral rights and cons
stitute just grounds of complaint, yet,
viewed relatively to the condition of
those powers. towards each other, and
of the United States towards both, the
undersigned cannot persuade themselves
that the orders in council as they now
exist and with their present effect and
operation, justify the selection of Great
Britain as our enemy, and render ne-
cessary a declaration of unqualified war.

Every consideration of moral duty, and
political expedience. seems to concur in
warning the United States, not to min-
gle in this hopeless and, to human eye,
interminable European contest. Neither
France nor England pretends that their
aggressions can be defended on the
ground of any other belligerent right
than that of particular necessity.

Both attempt to justify their encroach-
ments on the general law of nations by
the plea of retaliation. In the relative
position and proportion of strength of the
United States to either belligerent, there
appeared little probability that we could
compel the one or the other, by hostile
operations, to abandon this plea.

And as the field of cor mercial enter-
prise, after allowing to the decrees and
orders their full practical effect, is still
rich and extensive, there seemed as little
wisdom as obligation to yield solid and
certain realities for unattainable pretene
ions. The right of retaliation, as exist,
5

12

fap fneither belligerent, it was impossi-
ble for the United States, consistent with
€ither its duty or interest, 'to admit. Yet
such was the ostate of the decrees and
trder's ot the respective belligerents, in
relation, to the rights of neutrals, that,
while, on the one hand, it formed no jus-
tification to either, so on the other, con-
current, circumstances formed a com-

lete’ justification to the United States:

Nn maintaining, notwithstanding these
encroachments, provided it best,.com-
ported with their interests, that system
of impartial neutrality, which is so de-
sirable to their peace and prosperity.
For if it should be admitted, which no
course of argument can maintain, that the
Berlin decrees which was issued on the,
2ist of November, 1806, was justified
by the antecedent orders of the Bri-
tish admiralty, respecting the colonial
trade, and by the order of block-
ade’ of the i6th of May, preceding, yet
on this account, there resulted no right
of retaliation to France, as it’ respected
the United States. They had expressed
no acquiescence either in the British
interference with the colonial trade, or
in any extension of the principles of
blockade. Besidesy had there been any
such neglect, on the part of the United
Staies, as warranted the French empe-
rour in adopting his principle of retalia-
tion, yet in the exercise of that preten-
ded right, he past the bounds of both
publick law and decency; and in the very
€xtravagance of that exercise, lost the
advantage of whatever colour the British
had afforded to his pretences. Not con-
tent with adopting a principle of retaliay
tion, in terms limited, 4nd appropriate
to the injury of which he complained,
he declared, “ all the British Islands, in
a state of blockade; prohibited all com-
merce aid correspondence with them,
all trade in their manufactures; and made
lawful prize of all merchandise, belong-
ing to England, or coming from its ma

nufactories, and colonies.” The violence
of these encroachments was equalled only
by the insidiousness of the terms, and
manner, ia which they were promulga-

ted. _The scope of the’ expressions of
the Berlin decree, was so general that
it embraced within its sphere, the whole,
commerce of neutrals with. England.
Yet Decres, Minister of the Marine of
France, by a formal note, of the, 24th
December, 1806, assured our minister,
plenipotentiary, that the imperial decree,
of the 2lst November, 1806, was not
to affect our,commerce, which would stilt
be governed by the rules of the treaty;
established between the two countries.”
Notwithstanding this» assurance, howe-
ver, on the 18th September following
Regnier Grand Minister of justice, de-
claved “ that the intentions of the Emper- »
our were that. by virtue of that decrce
French armed vesséls, might seize in neu-
tral vessels, either English property, . of
merchandise proceeding from the English
manufactorices; and that he had reservedsy,
Jor future decision the question whether
they might not fossess themselves of'neu-
tral vessels going to or from England, al-
though they had no English manufactures
on board.” Pretensions se obviously
exceeding any measure of. fetaliation
that, if the precedent acts of the British
government, had afforded’ to such a re»
sort, any colour of right, it was lost in
the violence, and extravagance of these
assumed principles.

To the Berlin decree succeeded the
British orders in council, of the 7th of
January, 1807, which were merged in
the orders of the 11th of November fol.
lowing. These declared “ all ports, and
places belonging to France, and its allies,
from which the’ British flag was exchue
ded, all, in the colonies of his Britannick
majesty’s enemies, in a state of block-
ade;—prohibiting all trade, in the pro-
duce and manufactures, of the said-coun-
tries or colonies;:and making all vessels
trading to or from them, and all mer-
chandise, on board subject to capture and
condemnation, with an exception, only in
favour of the direct trade, between neu-
tral countries and the colonies of his
majesty’s enemies.”

These extravagant pretensions, on
the part of Great Britain, were imme-

:xpressions. of
general that
re, the whole,
th. England.
he Marine of
of the, 24th

our minister,

perial decree,
16, % was not
ch would stilt
of the treaty;
0 countries,”
rance, howe-
er following

ofthe Emper- »

f that decerce
seize in neues
frropfieriy, of
n the English

had reserved,

stion whether
elves of'neu-
England, al-
manufacturcs
@ obviously
f. fetaliation
f the British
lo such a re~

was lost in

ce of these

cceeded the
f the 7th of
merged in
vember fol-
il ports, and
d its allies,
was exclue
Britannick
of block-
in the pro-
b Said-coun-
all vessels
1 all mere
apture and
on, only in
ween neu-
bies of his

sions, on
re imme-

(

1S

_ diately succeeded, by others, still more
extravagant on the part of France.—
Without waiting for any knowledge of
the course the American government
would take, in relation to: the British or-
ders*in council, the French Emperour

issued, on,the 17th of December follow-

_ing, his Milan decree, by which “ every
ship of whatever nation, which shall have
submitted to search, by an English ship,
or to a voyage to England, or paid any
tax to that government, are declared
denationalized and lawful prizé.

«“ The British Islands are declared in
a state of blockade, by sea and iand, and
and every ship of, whatever nation, or

‘whatsover the nature of its cargo may
be, that sails from England, or those of
the English colonies, or of countries

, occupied by English troops, and pro-

ceeding to England, or to the English
_ Colonies, or to countries occupied by the
English, to be good prize.” The nature

sad. extent of these ‘njuries thus accu-_

mulated by mviuai eiforts of both belli-
gerents, seemed to teach the American
statesman this important lesson; not to
attach the cause of his country to one,
“or the viner; but by systematick and so-
-lid | provisions, for seacoast and mari-
time defence, to place its interests, as far
‘as its situation and resources permits
beyond the reach’ of the rapacity, or
ambition of any European power. Happy
would it have: been for our country, ifa
course of policy, so simple and obvious,
had been adopted !
Unfortunately administration had re-
course to a system, complicated in its
, nature, and destructive in its effects:
which, instead of relief from the accu-
mulated injuries of foreign governments,
served only to fill up, what was wanting
in.the measure of evils abroad, by artifi-
cial embarrassments at home. As long
ago asthe year 1794; Mr. Madison, the
present president of the U States, then a
member of the House of Representatives,
devised and proposed a system of commer-
cial restrictions, which had for its object
the coercion of Great Britain, by a denial
to her of our products and our market; as-

Tish r - 2 ” us ee ie Lb Mamet

serting that the former was, ina manner
essential to her prosperity, either as nes
cessaries of life, or as raw materials
for her manufactures; and that without
the latter, a great proportion of her la-
bouring classes, could not subsist.

In that day of sage and virtuous fores
thought, the proposition was rejected.
It remained, however, a theme of unceas-
ing panegyrick among an active class of
American politicians, who with a systes
matick pertinacity inculcated among the
people, that commercial restrictions were
a species of warfare, which would ensure
success to the United States, and humili-
tion to Great Britain.

There were two circumstances, inhe-
rent in this system of coercing Great
Britain by commercial restrictions, which
ought to have made practical politicians
very doubtful of its result, and very cau-
tious of its trial, These were the state
of opinion in. relation to its efficacy
among commercial men in the United
States; andthe state of feeling which a
resort to it would unavoidably produce
in Great Britain. On the one hand, it
was undeniable that the great body of
commercial men in the United States
had no belief in such a dependence of
Great Britain°upon the United States,
either for our produce or our market, as
the system implied. j

Without the hearty cooperation of thi
class of men, success in its attempt was
obviously unattainable. And as on them
the chief suffering would fall, it was al-
together unreasonable to expect.that they
would become cooperating instruments
in support of any system which was rain
to them and without hope to their coin.
try. On the other hand, as it respects
Great Britain, asystem proceeding upon
the avowed principle of her dependence
upon us was among the last .to which a
proud and powerful nation would yield.

Notwithstanding these obvious consi-
derations, in April, 1806, Mr. Madison
being then secretary of state, a law passed
congress prohibiting the importation of
certain specified manufactures of Great
Britain and her dependencies, on the ba-

14

sis of Mr. Madison’s original proposie tration, and its agents by their direction.

tion. Thus the United States entered But neither as publick men noras citizens
on the system of commercial hostility can they consent that the. peace and
against G. Britain. prosperity. of the country should be sa-

The decree of Berlin was issued in crificed, in maintenance of a position, .

the ensuing Novembe~ (1806.) The which on no principle of evidence. they
treaty, which had been signed at London, deem tenable. They cannot falsify or
in December, 1806, having been reject- conceal their conviction that the French

ed by Mr. Jefferson without being pre- decrees neither have been nor are revo’

sented to the senate for ratification, and ked. 7d
the non-importation act not being repeal- © Without pretending to occupy the
ed but only suspended, Great Britain is- whole field of argument which the quese
sued her orders in council, on the 11th tion of revocation has opened, a concise

November, 1807.
On the 2!st of the same month of No-
vember, Champagny, French minister of

statement seems inseperable from the
occasion.
The condition on which the non inter-

foreign affairs, wrote to Mr. Armstrong, course, according tothe act of lst Mays
the American minister, in the words fol- 1810, mightbe revived against G. Britain,
lowing: *“ All the difficulties which have was, onthe part of France, an effectual
given rise to your reclamations, sir, revocation of her. decrees. What the

would be removed with ease, if the go- president of the U. States was bound to -

vernment of the United States, after require from the French government was,

complaining in vain of the injustice and the evidence of such effectual revocation. *

violations of England, took, with the Upon this point both the right of the U.
whole continent, the part -of guaranty- States and the duty of the president’seem
ing it therefrom.” to be resolved into very distinct and un-

On the 17th of the ensuing December deniable principles. The object to be ob-
the Milan decrees were issued on the tained for the United States from France
part of France, and five days afterwards was, an effectual revocation of the des
the embargo was passed on the part of crees. A revocation to be effectual must.
the United States. Thus was comple- include, in the nature of things, thi8 es-
ted, by acts nearly cotemporaneous, the sential requisite; the wrongs done to the
circle of commercial hostilities, neutral commerce of the U. States, by the

After an ineffectual trial of four years operation of the decrees, must be stop- |

to control the policy of the two belli- ped. Nothing short of this could be an
gerents by this system, it was, on the part effectual revocation. >
of the United States, for’a time, reline | Without reference to the other.wrongs
quished. The act of the Ist May, 1810, resulting from those decrees to the com-
gave the authority, however, to the pre- merce of. the United States, it will be
sident of the United States to revive it sufficient to state the prominent. wrong
against G. Britain, in case France reve- done by the 3d’article of the Milan de-
ked her decrees. Such revocation on cree.* J. nature of this wrong essen-
the part of France was declared by the
president’s proclamation on the 2d Noy. — © This articve is in these words:

1810, and, in consequence, non inter — « ape, 777, The British islands are declared
course was revived by our administration tobe ina state of blockade, both by land and

against G. Britain.

At all times the undersigned have
looked with much anxiety for the evi-
dence of this revocation. They wished

sea. Every ship of whatever nation, or what-
soever the nature of its cargo may be, that
sails from the ports of England, or thgse ofthe
English colonies ,and of the countries occupied
by English troops and proceeding to England,

not to question what, in various forms, oy tothe English Colonies, or to countties oc-
hasbeen so often asserted by the adminis- cupied by English troops is good and lawfyl

-

eir direction.

or as citizens
>. peace and
should be sa-
f a position,
vidence. they
ot falsify or
t the French

nor are revoe *

occupy the
ich the quege
ed, a concise
le from the

he non inter.
tof lst Mays
st G. Britain,
. an effectual

What the

as bound to-

srnment was,
1 revocation. *
ht of the U.
ssident'seem
inct and un-
sct to be ob-
rom France
of the des
ectual must.
8, thi8 es.
one to the
ates, by the
stbe stop-
Ould be an

her. wrongs
o the com.
it will be
ent. wrong
Milan de-
png essen-

re declared
y land and
in, or what-
y be, that
hgse of the
8 occupied
o England,
intties oc.
d lawfyl

15@

tially consisted in the authority given'to
French ships of war and privateers to
make “prize, at sea, of every neutral
vessel sailing to or from any of the-En-
glish possesyons. Theauthority to cap-

ture was the very essence of the wrong.
Tt folfows; therefore, that an effectual re-

vocation required that: the authority to
capture should be annulled. Granting,
therefore, for the sake of argument (what
from its terms and its nature was cer-
tainly tot the case) that the noted letter
of the duke of Cadore of the 5th of Au-
gust, 1810, held forth a revocation, good
in point of form, and unconditional, yet
it was not that effectual revocation for
which the act of ae May: 1810, alone
authorized the president of the U. States
to issue his proclamation, unless in con-
sequence of that letter the authority to
capture was annulled. ‘The letter itself
is no annulment of the authority to cap-

ture, and it is notorious that no evidence

of the annulment of this authority to
capture everhas been adduced. It has
not even been pretended. On the con-
trary, there. is decisive and almost daily
evidence of the continued existence of
this authority to capture.

‘The charge of executing the decrees

-of Berlin and Milan was, so far as con-

cerned his department, given, by the
terms of those decrees, to the French mi-
nister of marine. According to establish-
ed principles of general law, the impe-
rial act which gave the authority must be
annulled by another imperial act, equally
formal and solemn; or, at least, the au-
thority to capture: must be countermand-
éd by some order or instruction from the
minister’ of marine. Nothing short of
this could annul the authority according
to the rule of the sea service. Was such
annulling act ever issued by the French
emperour? Were any such counter-
manding orders or instructions ever gi-
ven. by the French minister of marine?
In exercising a trust committed to him

prize, as contrary to the present decree, and
may be captured by our ships of war, or onr priva-
teers, and adjudged to the captor.”

= ——— eee acu”

by the legislature, on a point so interest-
ing to the neutral commerce of the U.
States, and so important to the peace of
the nation, was it not the duty of the pre-
sident to have the evidence of such an-
nulment before the issuing of any pro-
clamation? Has he ever insisted upon
such evidence? Was it of no conse-
quence in the relative situation of this
country as to forcign powers that the re-
gular evidence should he received by our
administration and made known? Why
has a matter of evidence, so obviously
proper, so simple in its nature, so level
to general apprehension, and so imperi-
ously demanded by the circumstances of
the case, been wholly omitted ? And why;
if the Berlin and Milan decrees are an-
nulled, as is pretended, does the French
emperour withhold this evidence of their
annulment? Why does,he withhold jit
when the question of revocation is pre-
sented under circumstances of so much
urgency ?

Not only has it never been pretended
that any such imperial act of annulment
has issued, or that any such orders or in-
structions, countermanding the authority
to capture, were ever given, but there i
decisive evidence of the reverse in the
conduct of the French publick armed
ships and privatcers.
Noy. 1810, these ships and privatecrs
have continued to capture our vessels
and property on the high seas, upon the
principles of the Berlin and Milan de-
crees. A numerous list of American
vessels thus taken since the lst of Nov.
1810, now exists in the office of the se-
cretary of state; and among the captures
are several vessels, with their cargoes,
lately taken and destroyed at sea, without
the formality of a trial, by the command-
er of a French squadron at this moment
cruising against our commerce, under
orders given by the minister of marine,
to whom the execution of the decrees
was committed; and these, too, issued in
January last. In the Baltick and Medi-
terranean seas, captures by French pri-
vateers ure known to us, by official docu-
ments, to have been made under the au-

At all times since.

thority of these decrees, How then are
they revoked? . How have they ceased to
vie'ate our neutral commerce?

Had any repeal, or modification of
those decrees, in truth taken place, it
must have been communicated to ,the
prize courts, and would have been evi-
denced by some variation either in their
rules, or inthe principles of their deci-
sions. In vain, however, will this nation
seek for such proof of the revocation of
the decrees. No acquittal has ever been
had, in any of the prize courts, upon the
ground that the Berlin and Milan decrees
had ceased, even as it respects the Uni-
ted States. On the contrary, the evidence
is decisive that they are considered by
the French courts as cxisting.

There are many cases corroborative of
this position. It is enough to state only
two, which appear in the official reports.
The American ship Julian was captured
by a French privateer on the 4th July
1811, and on the tenth of September
1811,the vessel and cargo were condemns
ed by the council of prizes at Paris,
among other reasons, because she was
visited by several English vessels, On
the same day the Hercules an American
Ship was condemned by the imperial
court of prizes, alleging ‘that it was
impossible, that she was not visited by
the enemy’s ships of war.” So familiar
to them wasthe existence of the decrees,
and such their eagerness to give them
effect against our commerce, that they
fained a visitation to have taken place,
and that notwithstanding the express de-
claration of the captain and crew to the
contrary. In addition to which evidence
Mr. Russell’s letter to the secretary of
state, dated 8th May 1811, says: It may
not be improper to remark that no Ame-
rican vessel captured since the Ist Noe
vember 1810, has yet been released.”

From this it is apparent that the com-
manders of the national vessels, the
privateersmen and the judges of the
prize courts, to which may be added also
the custom house officers, who, as the
instruments of carrying into effect the
decrees, must have been made acquaint-

@16

ed with the repeal had it existed, have
been, from first to last, ignorant of any ree
vocation; and uniformly. acted upon the
principle of their existence.

If other evidence of the continued ex-
istence of those decrees were requisite,
the acts ofthe French governmenrafford
such as is full and explicit. Champagny,
duke of Cadore, minister. of foreign rey
lationsy in his report to his majesty the
emperour and king, dated Pari’, 3d De-
cember, 1810, speaking of the decrees of.
Berlin and Milan, says expressly: As
long as England shall persistin her oy-
ders in council, your majesty will fersigt
in your decrees” ——Than which no decla-
ration can be moxg, direct not only. that
the Berlin and Millie decrees are unre-
voked, but that they, will so remain, until
the English orders in council are, with-
drawn. Andin the address delivered:by
his imperial majesty, Napoleon, to. the
council of commerce on the 31st March
1811,-he thus declares: “ The decress of
Berlin and «Milan are the. fundamental
laws of my empire. For the neutral na-
Vigation I consider the flag, as an exten-
sion of territory. The power which-suf-
fers its flag to be violated, cannot be con-
sidered as neutral. The*fate of the A-
merican commerce will soon be decided.
I will favour it if the United States con-
form themselves to these decrees, Ina
contrary case their vessels. will be driven
from my empire.”

And as late as the 10th.of March last,
in a report of the French minister of
foreign relations, communicated ¢o the
conservative senate, it is declared “ that
as long as the British orders in council
are not revoked, and the principles of
the treaty of Utrecht, in relation to neu-
trals put in force, the decrees of Berlin
and Milan ought to subsist, for the
powers who suffer their flag to be de-
nationalized.” In none of these acts is
there any exception in favour of the U.
States. And onthe contrary in the re-
port of March last, by placing those de-
crees on the basis of “ the principles of
the treaty of Utrecht,” the French minis-
ter has extended the terms of revocation
beyond all prior pretensions,

existed, have
ant of any res
ed upon the

ontinued ex-
ve requisite
nmentafford!
Champagny,
if foreign res
Majesty the
arid, 8 De-
he decrees of:
ressly: “& As
ist-in her oy
y will persist
ich no decla-
1ot only that
es are unre-
‘emain, until
il are with-
delivered:by
leon, to. the
31st. March
ie decress of
fundamental
> neutral na-
as an exten-
r which.suf-
nnot be con-
te of the A-
be decided.
i States con-
crees, Ina.
ill be driven

March last,
minister of
ated to the
lared “ that

in council
inciples of
ion to. neu-
s of Berlin
st, for the
to be de-
hese. acts is
r of the U,
in the re-
r those de-
rinciples of
tnch minis
revocation

Those who maintain the revocation of
these decrees as it respects the United
‘States, rely wholly upon the suspension
W@/ cf the decisions of the French prize
courts, in relation to some few vessels,
and the liberation of others, by the special
lirection of the Frengh emperour. Can
ihete‘be stronger presumptive evidence
@ Nehe existence of those decrees than
that no vessel is excepted from
eir operation, until after the special
exercise of the emperour’s will, in the
particular case.

If the decrees were effectively revo-
ked, there would be no captures; or if
any were made, liberation would be a
matter of course and of general right; in-
stead of being an affair of particular fa-
vour or caprice. Is it for vexations and

‘indulgencies like these, that the people
of the United States are to abandon their
commerce and peace? Is it for such fa-
vours they are toinvite the calamities of
war? Ifthe resources of negotiation were
exhausted, had the government no pow-
ere remaining to diminish the causes of
national controversy, by preventing
abuses? After this, had it no powers to
rovide for protecting indisputable and
important rights, without waging a war

of offence? Inthe regular exercise of
legislative and executive powers, might
not the fair objects of interest for our
country have been secured completely by
consistent and wholesome plans for de-
fensive protection? And would nota na-
tional position, strictly defensive, yet

q | highly respectable, have been less bur-

thensome to the people than the project-
ed war? Would it not be more friendly
to the cause of our own seamen—more
safe for our navigation and commerce;
more favourable to the interests of our
agriculture; less hazardous to national
» character; more worthy of a people jea-
‘Tous of their liberty and independence?
For entering into these hostilities is
| there any thing in the friendship or
commerce of France in its nature
very rs or alluring? Will
ithe ‘reaping of the scunty fields of
French trade, which we seek, in any

i7

way compensate for the rich harvest of
general commerce, which by war we are
about to abandon? When entering into
a war, with Great Britain, for commer.
cial rights and interests, it seems impos-
sible not to inquire into the state of
our commercial relations with France,
and the advantages the United States
will obtain. We may thus be enabled
to judge whether the prize is worth the
contest.

By an official statement, made to cone
gress during the present session, it ap-
pears that of 45,294,000 dollars of domes-
tick productions of the United States,
exported from September 30th, 1810, to
October Ist, 1811, only 1,194,275 dollars
were exported to France and. Italy, /in-
cluding Sicily, not a dependency of
France.

France is now deprived of all her fo-
reign colonies, and by reviewing our
trade with that country for several years
past and before the date of the orders in
council, it will appear that, exclusive of
her foreign possessions, it has been com-
paratively inconsiderable. The annexe
ed statement marked A taken from offi-
cial documents, shows the quantity of
particular articles, the produce of the
United States exported to all the world,
distinguishing the amount both to France
and to England and her dependencies
from 1810 to :611. From this statement
it appears, now small a proportion of the
great staples of our country is taken * by

*It appears by it that for twelve years past
France has not taken in any year, more than

Cotton 7,000,000 pounds
Rice 7.000 tierces
Tobacco 16,000 hogsheads
Dried Fish 87,000. quintals

Of flower, naval stores, and lumber, none ot
any importance,
It also appears, by it, that the annual average
taken by France for twelve years, was, of
Cotton 2,664,090 pounds

Rice 2,253 tierces,
' Tobacco 5,927 hogsheads
Fish 24,735 quintals

Of late years some of these articles have not
been shipped at all directly to France, but they
have, probably, found their way thither through
the northern ports of Evrope.

©

— OE I Napa P » ie or

18

Byance. While Franee retained her
colonies produce found its way to the mo-
ther country through the United States,
and our trade with her in these ar.
ticles, was not inconsiderable. But since
she has been deprived of her foreign pos-
sessions, and since the establishment of
her municipal regulations, as to licenses,
this trade has been in a great degree,
annihilated. With respect to colonial
produce none canbe imported into France
except from particular ports of the Uni-
ted States and under special imperial li-
censes. For these licenses our mer-
chants must pay what the agents of the
French government think proper to de-
mand. As to articles of our domestick
‘produce, they are burdened with such
exorbitant duties, and a! ‘ubjected to
such regulations and res’ _ tions on their
importation as, in ordi.) y times, will
amount to a prohibition. On the 5th of

August 1810, the very day of the duke
of Cadore’s noted letter, a duty was im-

osed on all sea island cotton, imported
nto France, of more than eighty cents
per pound, and on other cotton of about

aixty cents per pound, amounting tu three
or four, times their original cost in the
United States. And as to tobacco, the
French minister here on, the 23d July
1811 informed our government that it
was “under an administration [en ea
in France; the administra'ion (he says
is the only consumer and can purchase
only the quantity necessary for its con-
sumption.” And by other regulations
not more than one jifteeth of all the to-
bacco consumed in Fraice, can be of fo-
reign growth. The ordinary quantity
of tobacco annually consumed in France
is estimated at ¢hirty thousand hogsheads,
leaving only about two thousand hogs-
heads of foreign tobacco to be purchased
in France.

In addition to these impositions and
restrictions, the importer is not left at
liberty with respect to his return cargo.
By other edicts, he is compelled to vest
the avails of his importations, if, after
poying duties and seizures, any remain,

such articles of French produce and

manufacture, as the French government
thinks proper to direct. Two thirds at
least must be laid out in silks and the
other third in wines, brandies, and other
articles, of that country. To show that
this account of our commercial relations
with France does not rest on doubtful
authority, the undersigned would refer
to the statements and declarations of our
goretaenent on this subject. In a lette:

rom Mr. Smith, the late secretary of
state, to the minister of France here, of
the 18th December, 1810, speaking of
our trade to that country, under its regu-
lations, after the. pretended repeal of the
decrees, Mr. Smith says: “ The restric-
tions of the Berlin and Milan decrees had
the effect of restraining the American
merchants from sending their vessels to
France. The interdictions in the system
that has been substituted, against the
admission of American products, will
have the effect of imposing upon them an
equal restraint.”

“If then, for the revoked decrees,
municipal laws, producing the same
commercial effect have been substituted, -
the mode only, and not the measure, has
undergone an alteration. And however
true it may be, that the change is law-
ful in form, it is, nevertheless, as true,
that it is essentially unfriendly, and that
it does not at all comport with the ideas,
inspired by your letter of the 27th ult. in
which you were pleased to declare the
¢ distinctly pronounced intention of his
imperial majesty of favouring the com-
mercial relations, between France and
the United States, in all the objects of
traffick, which shall evidently proceed
from their agriculture, or manufactures.’
scIf France by her own acts, has blocka-
ded up her ports against the introduction
of the products of the United States,

_what motive has this government, in a

discussion with a third power, to insist
on the privilege of going to France?
Whence the inducement, to urge the
annulment of a blockade of France,
when, if annulled, no American cargoes
could obtain a market in any of her
ports? In such a state of things, a block-

ich government

Two thirds at
n silks and the
dies, and other

To show that
ercial relations
‘st on doubtful
ed would refer
larations of our
ct. In a lette
€ secretary of
France here, of
10, speaking of
under its regu.
d repeal of the

“ The restric-
lan decrees had
the American
their vessels to
s in the system
d, against the
products, will
y upon them an

oked decrees,
ng the same
en substituted, -
> measure, has
And however
thange is law.
less, as true,
ndly, and that
vith the ideas,
he 27th ult. in
to declare the
tention of his
‘ing the com-
n France and
the objects of
ntly proceed
nanufactures,”
sy has blocka-
P introduction
nited States,
rnment, in a
yer, to insist
to France?
to urge the
of France,
ican cargoes
any of her
DES; & block-

4 of the coast of France would be, to
© United States, as unimportant, as
would be a blockade of the coast of the
Caspian sea.”
And so far has the French emperour
en from ig cent in whole or in part,
hese odious regulations as to us, in con-
‘ soqyence of our submitting to give up
ur English trade, that they have been
’ Cade a subject of special instructions, to
the minister who has been sent to the
court of France. Mr Monroe, in his
letter of instructions \o Mr. Barlow of
July 26, 1811, saya: “ Your early and
particular atttention will be drawn to the
great subject of the commercial relation
which is to subsist, in future, between
the United States and France. The
President expects that the commerce of
the United States will be placed, in the
ports of France, on such a footing as to
afford it a fair market; and to the indus-
try and énterprise of their citizens, a
reasonable encouragement. An arrange-
ment to this effect was looked for, imme-
diately afterthe revocation of the decrees,
but it appears from the documents, in
this department, that that was not the
case; on the contrary that our commerce
has been subjected to the greatest discou-
ragement, or rather, to the most ofiftres
sive restraints; that the vessels, which
carried coffee, sugar, &c. though sailing
directly from the United States to a
French port, were held in a state of
sequestration, on the principle, that the
trade was prohibited, and that the impor-
mation of these articles was not only un-
lawful, but criminal; that even the ves-
sels, which carried the unquestionable
productions of the United States, were
exposed to great and expensive delays,
tedious investigations, in unusual forms,
and to exorbitant duties. In‘short that
the ordinary usages of: commerce be-
tween friendly nations were abandoned.”
Again Mr. Monroe, in the same let-
ter, says: ‘* It the ports of France, and
her allics are not opened to the com-
merce of the United States, on a libe.
ral scale and on fair conditions, of
what avail to them, it may be asked,

is

will be the revocation of the British of
ders in council? In contending for thé
revocation of hese orders, so far as it
was an object of interest,the United States
hadin view, a trade to the continent.’ It
was a fair, legitimate object and worth
contending for, while France encouraged
it. But if she shuts her ports on our
commerce, or burdens it with heavy
duties, that motive is at an end.” He
again says: “ You will see the injustice
and endeavour to prevent the necessity
of bringing in return for American care
goes, sold in France, an equal amount in
the firroduce, or manufactures of that
country. No such obligation is imposed
on French merchants, trading to the
United States. They enjoy the liberty
of selling their cargoes for cash, and
taking back. what they please from this
country, in return. It is indispensable,
that the trade be free, that all American
citizens engaged in it be placed on the
same footing, and, with this view, that
the system of carrying it on, dy licenses,
granted by French agents be immediatee
ly annulled.”

The despatches from Mr. Barlow, by
the Hornet, most clearly show that the
expectations of our government have not
only not been realized, but that even the
frromises obtained, by our minister are
of a very unsatisfactory nature. Indeed
while Bonaparte is sending armies to the
north of Europe, to take possession of the
ports on the Baltick, and by his fast sail-
ing squadrons, is burning American ves-
sels on the Atlantick, all expectations of
a free trade from France, must be*worse
than vain.

Notwithstanding the violence of the
belligerents, were the restrictions of our
own goverament removed, the commerce
of the United States might be extensive
and profitable. It is well known that
from the gallantry of our seamen, if mere
chant vessels were allowed to arm and
associate for self defence, they would be
able to repel many unlawful aggressions.
The danger of capture would be dimi-
nished, and in relation to one of the

belligerents at least, the risk, under such

20

circumstances, Would soon be measured tion of our restrictive system, By that

by ensurance, ; table it *pPears that the value of the
‘he discussions of our government, exports o |

in relation to the British orders in coun- France, Holland, and Italy, was, durin

Ples. on which they were issued. And exports to all other: parts of the world,
the French minister, in his last communi. and which are now left free to WS Not.
Cation, on this subject made to the Con- withstanding the effect of the British or.
Servative Senate, on the 10th of March ders in council, exceed thirty cighe mile
Jast, speaks of the blockade of the ‘loth of lions! So extensive a. commerce it ig
Uy 1806 «as annihilating the rights of P¥oposed to surrender for the restricted
all maritime States and putting: under trade the French €mperour will] allow,
interdiction whole coasts and empires;” A trade burdened by impositions, or. ha.
and of the orders 1) council of 1807, as rasseq by vexations, from French domi.
though stil} subsisting, and that accord. nation, and French Douaniere, or custom
ing to their Principles all vessels were house offic, Ts, in almost every port of
Compelied « to Pay a tribute to England Continental Europe,
and ull cargoes a tariff to her ustoms,” —_As in the Scale of Commercial advan.
hat the real extent and Principle of tages France has little to offer, in res
the blockade of May 1806 were, turn, for the many obviong hazards, which
ave already been explained. With 4ccording to the wish of her Emperour,
respect to the British orders of 1807, the United States are about to incur;
the truth is, that by a new order issy. so, in the moral estimate of National

NOxXlous transit duty called by the French Scene of things, on which we are enter.
Minister « tribute and tariff” was done ing,

away, The new order of April 1809, A nation, like the United States, hap.
which is now the subject of complaint is PY inits great local relations; removed

together with the colonies, Plantations * Value of articles of domestick Produce, ex.
and settlements in the possession of those ibis 4 hs the world, iy
§ovecnments respectively, and al! ports 4 n 1807

and places jn the northern parts of Italy, Whole amount, $41,953,797 Mr 699,508

to be reckoned from tie ports of Orbi- et Rese ith.

tello and Pesuro, inclusively,” To France 3,226,698 2,716,141
The effect then ofthe British orders of To Holland, now

blockade now in force, is to deprive us __ part of Franee 5,609,964 5,098,234

of the Commerce of France, Holland and T° Italy 185,346 250,257

a part of Italy, And they leave open to 7,022,008 6,064,632

US the commerce of all the rest of the rena, :

world. What that is, some estimate may To England and

be formed by recurrence to the subjoin. ‘ Cig 19,179,981 27,915,077

ed table, which exhibits the state ofour To all other parts

commerce during 1806 and 1807—the of the world 14,051,740 14,719,883

two last years antecedent to the opera- 34,231,791 42,634,560

eee — moe eemmeghy

system. By that
the value of the
stick products, to
Italy, was, durin

nh average only o
illion of dollare.o—
of our domestick
arts of the world,
ft free to ws note

of the British or-.

d thirty eight mile
a commerce it is
for the restricted
perour will allow.
m positions, or. ha-
om French domi-
waniere, or custom
st every port of

ommercial advan-
le to offer, in ree
1s hazards, which
of her Emperour,
- about to incur;
nate of national
ttle character to
xpect in the dark
h we are enter-

ited States, hap-
lations; removed
of Europe; with
ng vast fields for
rial possessions,
want;——its fire.

stick produce, exe

In 1807
Whole amount,
$48,699,592

eS — eT

2,716,141

3,098,234
250,257

6,064,632

27,915,077
14,719,883
42,654,960

ees ee

21
sides safe;—its altars undefiled;—from

invasion nothing to fear;—from acqui-
sition nothing to hope;—how shall such
a nation look to Heaven for its smiles,
while throwing away, as though they
were worthless,’ all the blessings atid
joys, which peace and such a distin-
guished lot, include? With what pray-
.ers can it address the Most High, when
it prepares to pour forth its youthful
rage; upon a neighbouring people; from
whose strength, it has nothing to dread,
from whose devastation it has nothing to
gain ?

If our ills were of a nature that war
“would remedy; if war would compensate
any of our losses; or remove any of our
complains, there might be some allevia-
tion of the suffering in the charm of the
‘prospect. But how will war upon the

and protect commerce upon the ocean?
What balm has Canada for wounded
honour? How are our mariners benefited
by a war which exposes those who are

» free, without promising release to those

who are impressed?

But it is said that war is demanded by
honour. Is national honour 4 principle
which thirsts after vengeance, and is ap-
peased only by blood; which, trampling
on the hopes of man, and spurning the
law of God, untaught by what is past and
careless of what is to come, precipitates
itself into any folly or ~~dness to gratify
a selfish vanity or to satiatiate some
unhallowed rage? If honour demands
aawar with England, what opiate lulls
that honour to sleep over the wrongs done
us by France? On land, robberies, sei-
zures, imprisonments by French autho-
rity; at sea, pillage, sinkings, burnings
under French orders. These are notori-
ous. Are they unfelt because they are
French? Is any alleviation to be found in
the correspondence and humiliations of
the present minister plenipotentiary of
the United States at the French court?
In his communications to our govern-
ment, as before the publick, where is the
cause for now selecting France, as the
friend of our country and England as the

enemy?

If no illusions of personal fecling, and
no solicitude far elevation of place, should
be permitted to misguide the publick
councils; if it is, indeed, honourable tor
the true statesman to consult the publick
welfare, to provide,in truth, for the pub-
lick defence, and‘ impose no yoke of
bondage; with full knowledge of the
wrongs inflicted by the French, ought
the government of this country to aid
the French cause by engaging in war
against the enemy of France? To sup-
ply the waste of such a war and to meet _
the appropriations of millions extraor-
dinary, for the war expenditures, must
our fellow citizens, throughout the union,
be doomed to sustain the burden of war
taxes, in various forms of direct and indi-
rect imposition ? For official informa-
tion, respecting the milions deemed re-
quisite for charges of the war; for like
information, respecting the nature and
amount of taxes, deemed requisite for
drawing those millions from the com-
munity, it is here sufficient to refer to
estimates and reports made by the se-
cretary of the treasury and the committee
of ways and means, and to the body of
resolutions, passed in March last, in the
house of representatives.

It would be some relief to our anxiéty,
if amends were likely to be made, for
the we"kness and wildness of the project,
by the prudence of the preparation. But
in no aspect of this anomalous affair
can we trace the great and distinctive
properties of wisdom. ‘There is seen a
headlong rushing inio difficulties, with
little calculation about the means and little
concern about the consequences. Witha
navy comparatively nominal, we are aiiout
to ehter into the lists against the greatest
marine onthe globe \\ ith a commerce,
unprotected and spread over every ocean,
we propose to make profit by privateering,
and for this endanger the wealth, of which
we are honest proprietors. An invasion is
threatened of the colonies of a power,
which, without putting a new ship into
commission, or taking another soldier in«
to pay, can spread alarm, or desolae
tion along the extensive range of our

22

seaboard. The resources of our country,
in their natural state, great beyond. our
Warts, or our hopes are impaired by the
effect of artificial restraints, Before ade-
quite fortifications are prep: red for do-
mestick dtfence, before meh, or money
are provided for a war of attack. why has-
ten into the midst of that awful contest,
wich is laying waste Europe? It cannot
be concealed, that to engage in the pre-
sen war against Enyland is to place our:
atlves on the side of France; and exposes

‘ ws tothe vassalage of states, serving un-

der the banners of the French Emperour.

The undersigned cannot refrain from
asking what are the United States to gain
by this war? Will the gratification of
some privateersmen compensate the na-
tion for that sweep of our legitimate com-
merce hy the extended marine of our
enemy, wich this desperate act invites?
Will Canada compensate the middle
states, for New York; or the western states
for New Orleans? Let us not be deceiv-

ed A war of inva.ion may invite a retort

ot invasion. When we visit the peacea-
ble, and, as to us, innocent colonies of
Great Britain with the horrous of war can
we be assured that our own coast will nat
be visited with like horrours?

Ata crisis of the world such as the pre
sent, and under impressions such as these,
the undesigned could not consider the war
into which the U. States have, in secret,
been precipitated, as necessary, or requir-
ed by any moral duty, or any political ex-
pediency

George Sullivan, Martin Chittenden,
Abijh. Bigelow,
Willian Ely,
‘illiam Reed, Sami, Taggart,
Laban Wheaton, Leonard White,
Richard Jackson, jun. Elisha R. Potter,
Efiaph’s Champion, Jno. Davenport, jr.
Lyman Law, Jona. O. Moseley,
Lewis B. Sturges,

Elijah Brigham,

Josiah Quincy,

Fimo, Pitkin, jun.

Benjamin Tallmadge, H. Bleecker,

James Emott, Asa Fitch;
Thos. R. Gold, James Milnor,
Hi. M. Ridgely, C. Goldaboroughy
Philin B., Key; Philip Stuart,

John Baker, Jas. Breckenridge,

Jos. Lewis, jun, Thos. Wilson, .,

A, MBryde, Jos. Pearson.
NOTE A. yg

Quantity of particular articles, the fara-
duce of the United States, exported
Jrom 1800 ¢o 1811, viz,

COTTON.
ft To all parts
ofthe world, T°France. To England
lba, lbs. lbs. +
1800 17,789.803 none 16,179,513
1801} 20911,201 844,728 18,953,065 *

1802 27,501,075 1,907,849 23,473,995
1803 41,105,623 3,821,840 27,757,307
1804 38,118,941 5,946,848 25,770,748
1805 40,383,491 4,504,329 $2,571,074
1806 37,491.282 7,082,118
1807 66,612,737 6,114,358
1808 12,064,346 2,087,450
1809* 53,210,225 none direct 13,365,957

1010+ 93,874,201 do. 86,171,915

1811 69,186 do. 46,872,452
RICE. ,

Tierces Tierces Tierces

1800 112,056 none 77,547

1801 94,866 2,724 65,023

* In 1809, in consequen.e of the embargo
and non-intercourse act, 4 millions of pounds of
Cotton were shipped for Madeira, 10 and a lialf
millions to the Floridas, 6 mi'ions to Fayal
and other Azores, 1 million and three quarters
to Portugal, and 10 millions to Sweden.

¢ 1810, about 4 millions of pounds of Cotton
were shipped for Spain, 3 millions for Portu-
gal, 3 millions for Madeira, 10 millions for Flo-
ridas, 2 millions for Kurope generally, 4 mile
lions for Fayal and the Azores, 14 millions for
Denmark and Norway, and § millions for
Sweden.

+ In 1811, 9 millions of pounds of Cotton,
were shipped for Russia.

24,256,457 ‘
7,992,593 (fr

eecker,y

Fitch,

Milnor,

Idaborough,

Stuart, 1808

Breckenridge, =, ce

Wilson. a fa

Pearson. ” pe
my

plea, the para-

tes, exported

. ToEngland
lbs.
16,179,513 |
‘ 8,953,065 ¥
23,473,995 —
27,757,307
25,770,748
$2,571,074
24,256,457 ©
53,180,211
7,992,593 °
13,365,967
86,171,915
46,872,452

Ss llr Te TTS la

Q
~~

Tierces
77,547

) 65,033 —— F

of the embargo
ons of pounds of
ra, 10 and alialf /
lions to Fayal
1 three quarters
Sweden.

ounds of Cotton
ons for Portus
millions for Flo-
nerally, 4 mil-
, 14 millions for °
§ millions for a)

is

3801

unds of Cotton,

ae ie
ci 803
ms

Toall parts cfiheworld Tr date To Fnplanh
1804 810, 74 258.518 |
1805 777,512 none 235,'76
1806 782 724 hone 308.048
1807 1,249 819 none 619.9 8
1808 263 213 hone 70 084
1809 846 247 none 230 822
1810 798,431 none 192 477
1811 1,445 012 2964 275 534

NAVAL STORES—TAR.
Bbls Bbls Bbls
1800 59.410 none 58 798
1801 67 487 none 62 632
1802 37.497 797 21.330
1803 78.989 none 75 395
1804 58 181 do 45 210
1805 72.745 do §9.439
1806 62 723 do 50,668
1807 59,282 do 51 232
1808 18.764 do 17 700
1809 128.090 do 82 072
1810 87,310 do 50.021
18it 149.796 do 123 034
‘ TURPENTINE,
1800 33.129 no.e 32 580
1801 85 418 do 35.143
1802 38 764 do 36.769
1803 61,178 do 60 732
1804 77 825 do 76,950
1805 95,640 do 94 328
1806 74.7381 do 71.854
1807 53.451 do 52 107
1808 17 061 do 17 009
1809 77 398 do 22,885
1810 62912 do 86.995
181] 100,242 do 97 250
LUMBER.

Of the vast quantitics of Lumber ex-

ported from 1800 to 1811, only a few

Staves and Heading went to France, as
follows, viz.

Thousands of Stavee and Heading.

23.
hy world To France To England
9,822 7,186 37,393
81,838 3,116 00
78,385 6,014 49,75
56,830 1,601 24,7387
102,627 3,392 39,298
9,692 3,006 37,417
9,228 none direct . 4,298
116,907 do 32,138
119,356 do 40,045
TOBACCO.
Hhds Hhds Hhds
78,680 143 $7,798
103,758 5,006 §5,256
77,721 16,216 29,938
86,291 9,815 47,829
83,343 14,623 24,700
71,752 12,135 18,169
83,186 9,182 26,272
62,232 2,876 23,047
' 9,576 566 2,526
52,921 mone direct 8,965
84,134 do 24,067
35,828 569 20,342
FISH, Dried or Smoked.
Quintals Quintals Quintals
392,727 none 141,420
410,948 1,687 111,030
440,929 27,067 92,679
461,870 3,491 71,795
567,828 3,765 76,822
514,549 73,004 55,676
§37,457 19,347 66,377
473,924 87,654 55,242
155,808 16,144 26 998
345 648 nene 66,566
280804 | 2,150 55.456
216,387 28.622 33,243
: PICKLED FISH.
"None exported to European France.
FLOWER.
Bbls. Bbls. Bbs.
653,052 none 365,739
1,102,444 none 758.023
1,156,248 14628 484 886
1,311,853 18,045 502,006

1801
1803
1804
1805
1806
1807
1608

6,349
357
321
466
716
616
105

|

oie RBS cE RR

1 Co serass to their constituents on the subject of the war with Great Britain.
sewed, uncut.

24

THE subscribers to the foregoing ad-
dress having referred to the report of
the secretary of the treasury, for « offi;
cial information respecting the millions
deemed requisite for charges of the war;
and to estimates and reports made by
the secretary of the treasury and the
committee of ways and means, and to
the body of resolutions passed in’ March
last in the house of ‘representatives, for
like information respecting the*nature
and amount of taxe. deemed’ requisite
for drawing those millioris from the com-
munity,” the editor has thought proper
to subjoin the following list of bills re-
ported to the house of ‘representatives,
by the committee of ways and means, on
the 26th of June 1812. . These bills for
taxing the people to an amnountaltogether
unexampled and unknown in:tiiis coun-
try, are drawn in gtrict conformity to the
estimates, reports, and resolutions above
referred to; but instead of being inmme-
diately passed into laws, they were, upon

‘a motion of Mr. Roberts of Pennsylvania,

ordered to lie on the, table, and, the
further consideration of them. was after-
wards postponed on motion of the-same
gentleman, till the first Monday in ,No-
vember next, which will be after the elec-
tion of a President and Vice President.

A motion to print the bills was reject-
ed bya Jarge majority. It is said that
the friends of Mr. Madison’s reelection
in congress from Pennsylvania concur-
red in the opinion that it woukt te ha-
zardous to let the people feel the weight
of these enormous and unexampled taxes
before the choice ofelectors. The pass-
ing of the bills was therefore postponed,
and an early session of congress ordered,
so that as soon as the election is over
they are to be taken up and the taxes laid

without delay. In the mean time a law has~

been passed for issuing Treasury Notes,
end increasing the national debt by bor-

839 War ot 1812.

Philadelphia (1812).

giek 6, ~

enpply the wants of the governmen

rowing money, which, it*is hoped, ‘a
Ls
aftePhe election.

.

The following is a list of the bills it

laying ihe téxes which are to Sup

port Mr. Madison and the, war. .

A bill to lay and collect a direct tax
within the United States. [Land Tax.
A bill for the assessment and coll

tion of direct taxes and internal duticag?

A bill imposing additional duties om
the tonnage of shipsand vesse]s.
A bill to retain 25 per centim on’

Bes

drawbacks allowed by law. "St,

A bill laying a duty on imported salt
A bill to establish’ the office of ¢
missioner of the Revenue.
A bill :o lay duties on licenses to
tailers of wines, spirituous liquors,

foretgn merchaadise.

A billto lay duties on carriages for
conveyance of persons. }

A bill to lay duties on licenses to dige
tillers of spirituous liquors. [Whisky
Tax.} ag

A bill laying duties on sales at auctig
of foreign merchandise, and of ships oP
vessels. be

A bill laying duties on sugar refi;
within the United States.

A bill laying duties on bank no
and on notes of hand, and on sou
bills of exchange of acertain descripti
(Stamp Tax.] b.

A bill making further provision for the
Collection of internal duties,

An address of members of the House of Representatives of!

8vo, |
CF 1b .§0 |»

4.